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By: Lisa Lim, MST Student
Introduction
Value added tax (VAT), a consumption-based tax, is often considered as an alternative to reduce
a government’s reliance on the income tax. Globally, over 140 countries have adopted the VAT
to generate revenue and serve as a border-adjustable tax (unlike the income tax).32 The United
States is the only OECD member nation without a VAT.33
This analysis examines a proposal to implement a broadbased, low, single-rate credit-invoice VAT in the United
States. The introduction of a federal-level VAT would be
supplemented by a simplified federal income tax with fewer
tax brackets, lower income tax rates and a scaled-down tax
preference regime. The intent of such a proposal is to
improve the overall tax regime in the United States.
Principles of Good Tax Policy Evaluation
The following chart explains how the principles of good tax policy apply to the proposal to
impose a VAT along with a greatly simplified income tax in the United States. The analysis uses
the ten principles of good tax policy outlined in the AICPA Statement #1, Guiding Principles of
Good Tax Policy: A Framework for Evaluating Tax Proposals.
Principles of Good Tax Policy Evaluation
Principle

Application

Rating

Equity and
Fairness

VAT is generally regarded as a regressive tax. Under this
proposal, a broad-based single-rate VAT that applies to all
goods and services, without any compensating measures is the
most regressive form of VAT.

+/-

Similarly
situated
taxpayers treated
similarly.

Vertical equity and the ability-to-pay principle are adversely
affected by a broad-based VAT. This is because the total VAT
paid represents a higher tax burden as a percentage of current
income of a lower-income taxpayer than a higher-income
taxpayer. Further, low income taxpayers are thought to be the
hardest hit because they tend to spend a larger proportion of
their income on basic necessities than any other group.34
However in an IMF publication, Ebrill et al. (2001), pointed out

32

33
34

OECD, Consumption Tax, available at
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_33739_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

Ibid.
Alain Charlet and Jeffrey Owens, “An International Perspective on VAT," Tax Notes International,
September 2010, p 949; available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/45/46073502.pdf.
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that the impact of VAT is highly regressive only when measured
against current income, in isolation.35 The alternative view
suggested is to assess the wider impact of the overall tax system.
Ebrill et al. (2001) conclude that a broad-based VAT is neither
regressive nor progressive, if other compensating direct
government spending programs and a progressive income tax
regime are taken into account.
Another alternative view considers ability-to-pay from a
consumption standpoint, rather than from an income
perspective. If one can afford to consume more goods, this
directly indicates a higher ability-to-pay. Hence the VAT will
impose a tax that is in proportion to a person’s ability-to-pay,
resulting in vertical equity.
The 2005 Bush Tax Reform Panel report noted the regressive
nature of VAT, but the Panel believed it was possible to achieve
an “approximately distributionally neutral” VAT.36 To achieve
this, some adjustments to the VAT proposal would be required,
including changing the VAT rate structure and providing a
refundable tax credit.
Although lacking vertical equity, a broad-base single-rate VAT
is favored because it adheres to several other principles (as
noted below) such as simplicity, neutrality and certainty. In
practice, the regressive nature of VAT is usually addressed by
governments through a multi-rate structure. Goods are
categorized and taxed at different rates, similar to the current
sales tax regime in the US. But, the administrative cost of
providing a VAT rate differential must be examined against the
benefits of improving the distributional fairness of a VAT.37
Certainty
The tax rules
should clearly
specify when the
tax is to be paid,
how it is to be
paid, and how the
amount to be paid
is to be
determined.
35

Generally, under the single-rate credit-invoice VAT, all
businesses collect a uniform VAT calculated on the sales price.
At the end of the reporting period, total VAT collected is
reduced by total VAT paid on all purchases. Assuming a
profitable business with receipts higher than input purchases, the
excess VAT collected is then remitted to the authorities. If VAT
paid is greater than what the business collected in VAT, a refund
is issued. This is a relatively simple and straightforward
procedure that aids certainty.

+

Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen, Jean-Paul Bodin, and Victoria Summers, The Modern VAT, International Monetary
Fund, 2001, ISBN: 1-58906-026-1, p 105.

36

President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, “Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix
America’s Tax System”, November 2005, p 191; available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/.
37
Vito Tanzi and Howell Zee, “Tax Policy for Developing Countries,” International Monetary Fund,
March 2001, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues27/index.htm.
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Convenience of
Payment
A tax should be
due at a time or
in a manner that
is most likely to
be convenient for
the taxpayer.

The payment of a consumption tax, such as VAT is extremely
straight forward and simple. From a consumer point of view, a
VAT is no different from a sales tax. VAT is applied on the final
purchase price and is paid at the point-of-sale. Under a broadbased VAT, most purchases of goods and services would have
VAT added to the price.

Economy in
Collection
The costs to
collect a tax
should be kept to
a minimum for
both the
government and
taxpayers.

In general, introducing a new VAT system in the US would
increase the administrative burden and cost for the government.
The main concern is the fixed cost to set up a new VAT
administrative system within the IRS. These include training
programs for IRS staff, implementation of a new IT system,
issuance of forms, instructions and technical guidance, taxpayer
awareness programs, and enforcement plans to ensure that all
taxpayers can properly comply with the VAT.

+

On the business front, payment of VAT is also relatively
convenient. The excess VAT collected at the end of the
reporting period is remitted to the tax authority. Again, this
process does not differ from the existing procedure with the
income tax.
+/-

In a 1993 report, the US Government Accountability Office
(GAO) estimated that the cost of administering a broad-based
VAT in 1995 would be between $1.22 billion and $1.83 billion
annually.38 However, more recent studies showed that a broadbase single-rate VAT is in fact a more cost-efficient way to
collect tax in the long run. The Bush Tax Reform Panel (2005)
noted that in our current income tax system, the compliance cost
is approximately 13 cents per dollar of tax paid, while the
compliance cost of VAT in the EU countries range between 3 to
5 cents per dollar of tax paid.39
Accordingly, VAT is known as an extremely efficient revenue
generator and hence the name, “money machine”. A 1% VAT in
the US is estimated to generate approximately $37.8 billion in
revenues.40 Assuming that there is no marginal cost of
compliance, increasing the VAT rate to 10% can effectively
raise revenues without triggering additional compliance burdens.

38

U.S General Accounting Office, “Report to the Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S. Congress, ValueAdded Tax: Administrative Cost Vary With Complexity and Number of Business," May 1993, p 5;
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GGD-93-78.
39
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, “Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix
America’s Tax System,” November 2005, p 201; available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/.
40
James M Bickley, “VAT as a New Revenue Source”, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional
Research Service," June 2005.
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In other words, VAT produces a high revenue yield and supports
a cost effective collection process.
Simplicity
The tax law
should be simple
so that taxpayers
can understand
the rules and
comply with
them correctly
and in a costefficient manner.

In general, adding a VAT to the current income tax regime
would not complicate matters for most individual taxpayers,
who are consumers. There are no additional filing and reporting
requirements for individuals who do not operate a business. And
taxpayers stand to benefit from a simpler income tax regime that
accompanies the proposal. However, adding on a VAT on top of
the current corporate income tax regime could create another
layer of complexity for businesses.

Neutrality
The effect of the
tax law on a
taxpayer’s
decisions as to
how to carry out
a particular
transaction or
whether to
engage in a
transaction
should be kept to
a minimum.

Under the current income tax regime, tax is imposed twice.
Once on income earned and later again when the income saved
earns interest. This is said to discourage savings and encourage
current spending. However, as a consumption tax, VAT does not
tax interest earned on savings or capital gains.

Economic
Growth and
Efficiency
The tax system
should not
impede or reduce

Some analysts point to several negative effects on the broader
US economy upon implementation of a VAT. One primary
concern is the creation of an upward inflationary pressure
causing an increase in consumer goods prices. In the 2005 CRS
report by Bickley, it was noted that VAT would cause a “onetime” increase in consumer prices.41 Unlike other European

41

+/-

But as mentioned under the principle of “certainty,” a broadbase single-rate credit-invoice VAT is relatively simple to
administer. Businesses collect a uniform VAT on all their
invoices and pay a uniform VAT on all purchases. Excess VAT
collected is remitted to the authorities. Capital purchases qualify
for input VAT refunds. And goods for export are not taxed.
Without special exemptions and multiple rates, this form of
single-rate VAT will be the easiest to comply with. Thus it is
possible that VAT coupled with a simplified corporate tax
regime could create a combined system that is potentially more
business-friendly. The possibility of states replacing their sales
tax systems with the federal VAT could yield further
simplification.
+

Also, a broad-based single-rate VAT ensures uniformity and
neutrality. The consumer choice is not distorted among various
goods and services. This applies to businesses as well. There
will be no economic incentive or disincentive to purchase or
produce any one item. Thus, the neutrality of the tax system is
better preserved.

+

Ibid.
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the productive
capacity of the
economy.

countries which had an existing federal-level sales tax replaced
with a VAT, the US does not currently have a federal-level sales
tax. Thus a VAT introduction is expected to cause a one-time
increase in prices. However, VAT cannot be said to cause
sustained upward inflationary pressure.
The second concern points to the efficiency of a VAT to
generate enormous amounts of revenues that ultimately fuels
government spending. However, studies show that there is no
conclusive evidence to link the revenue potential from VAT to
government expansion.42 In fact, a case study of Canada shows
that government spending gradually declined after the institution
of a VAT in 1991. Subsequently, the Canadian VAT rate was
reduced further shrinking government revenues and
expenditures.43
A third concern is the intrusion of VAT into the state’s sales and
use tax (SUT) base. Opponents argue that combining a federal
level VAT on top of a state SUT will lead to an excessive rise in
prices that will curb public consumption.44 This concern was
supported by a report prepared by Ernst & Young LLP for the
National Retail Federation. The report found that introducing a
VAT in the US will cause a significant decline in retail spending
that will ultimately result in the loss of 850,000 jobs nationwide
within the first year.45
On the other hand, there is substantial support from
commentators who believe that the state sales tax can be
successfully integrated with the federal VAT. In the scenarios
proposed, states could remove their existing SUT regime and
“piggyback” on the federal VAT administration. States retain
the autonomy to impose additional percentage points on top of
the federal VAT, while a centralized administration program
creates efficiency and economy in collection.46
More importantly, the VAT is known to be administratively

42

Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, “Do Tax Cuts Starve the Beast: The Effect of Tax Changes
on Government Spending,” National Bureau of of Economic Research, October 2007, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024965.
43
William Gale and Benjamin Harris, “A Value Added Tax for the United States: Part of the Solution”,
Brookings Institution and Tax Policy Center, July 2010, p 11; available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001418_VAT_solution.pdf.
44
Peter Roff, “Kansas Republican: VAT Tax Would Cripple U.S. Recovery,” May 28, 2010; available at
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2010/05/28/kansas-republican-vat-tax-would-crippleus-recovery.
45
Robert Carroll, Robert Cline, Tom Neubig, John Diamond and George Zodrow, “The Macroeconomic
Effects of an Add-on VAT,” Ernst & Young LLP, prepared for the National Retail Federation, October
2010; available at http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/TEPP-pub-NRFValueAddedTax-100710.pdf.
46
Ibid.
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superior over the SUT in many ways. VAT can help strengthen
taxation of interstate e-commerce, resolve the sales tax
pyramiding issues and create a stronger audit trail to support
enforcement efforts that ultimately reduces the state tax gap.
Transparency
and Visibility
Taxpayers
should know that
a tax exists and
how and when it
is imposed upon
them and others.

VAT is highly transparent and visible. This is contrary to many
public myths that VAT will be hidden between the convoluted
production and distribution chain. In reality, under the current
income taxation regime, many taxpayers are not fully aware of
their effective tax rates. They are also unaware of how other
taxes such as property tax and SUT interact to affect their
overall tax burden. On the other hand, VAT is extremely
visible. VAT can be printed on every invoice and receipt upon
purchase. Taxpayers will know exactly how much VAT is paid
on every transaction, at the checkout counter. The elimination of
pyramiding under a VAT also helps transparency. For example,
today, while food is exempt from sales tax in many states, there
may indeed be some sales tax hidden in the price of food due to
the sales tax grocery stores pay on equipment and other
purchases.

+

The other contention is that taxpayers would not know their total
annual VAT liability, unless receipts are saved and tallied
annually. But this is true of the current state sales tax regime as
well. To be sure, the newly implemented VAT should be added
on top of the prices of goods, instead of having the VAT
imputed within the prices. This will ensure that the overall
visibility of the VAT is not compromised.
Minimum Tax
Gap
A tax should be
structured to
minimize noncompliance.

VAT has been praised for its superior administrative features.
Key among them is the creation of a strong audit trail in the
invoices between businesses and taxpayers. Under the credit
invoice approach, every business in the supply chain imposes
and collects a portion of the VAT on every sale made. There is
an inherent incentive for businesses to collect VAT in order to
report and offset the VAT paid from their purchases. Thus, VAT
mitigates situations whereby end-retailers and customers collude
to evade the sales tax completely.

+/-

However, VAT is not an airtight process that is “evasion-free.”
In the EU, several VAT fraud schemes have been identified.47
Among the most proliferated fraud techniques are the use of
cash transaction in a “black economy,” non-reporting of VAT
47

International VAT Association, “Combating VAT Fraud in the EU, The Way Forward,” March 2007, p
6 to 10; available at www.iva-online.org/documents/IVA_Paper_FINAL.pdf.
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by insolvent companies, and the missing trader fraud also
commonly known as the “carousel type fraud.”
Appropriate
Government
Revenues
The tax system
should enable the
government to
determine how
much tax
revenue will
likely be
collected and
when.

According to the Tax Policy Center, a 5% broad-based VAT
would have generated approximately $200 billion in revenue in
2010. The aggregate revenue potential in a 10-year span
beginning 2010 to 2019, is expected to reach $3.2 trillion.48

+

Further, a broad-based VAT promotes a more stable and durable
revenue stream. There will be a baseline spending on necessities
and basic services, which will maintain a certain amount of
revenue. However, as with all consumption taxes, VAT
revenues may eventually suffer from tightening wallets in the
event of a prolonged economic downturn.

Conclusion
A broad-based single rate VAT meets six principles of good tax policy. However, it did not fully
meet the requirements for equity, simplicity, economy in collection and minimum tax gap.
Therefore, the timing for implementation of a VAT (if considered) is crucial. Introducing a VAT
in a fragile economic environment could cause unintended consequences beyond those examined
in the Principles of Good Tax Policy framework.
Possible Improvements: To address the equity issue, the solution typically applied is to provide
some type of annual credit relief that reduces the regressive impact of a VAT. Simplicity can be
preserved by ensuring that the VAT system will not be fraught with special exemptions and
multiple rates. The administration must be committed to a single VAT rate to avoid confusing
taxpayers. Also, the current corporate income taxation regime must be truly simplified to account
for the additional VAT burden. To address the economy in collection concern, the fixed start-up
cost of establishing the VAT system cannot be underestimated. The start-up cost must be
balanced with the long run expected efficiency of VAT collection. To address the minimum tax
gap concern, the US must look to the experience of its counterparts in the OECD. The US stands
to benefit from the various lessons derived from other governments that can improve VAT
operations.

48

Tax Policy Center, Table T09-0442; available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/pdf/T090442.pdf
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